27 Nov

3Gpp Authentication And Key Agreement

A message authentication code is a functional family, where the domain is and. For and is the MAC of . An opponent, , is a probabilistic polynomer time algorithm that has oracle access for the calculation of MAC for random keys. The advantage of Mac is the probability that this is spent and has not been a query to the oracle of. The uncertainty function of is we say that is a secure information authentication code, so, for each polynomially limited opponent, is negligible in . AKA is the basis of the 3G authentication mechanism, which is defined as the successor to CAVE-based authentication, and provides mutual authentication procedures for the Mobile Station (MS) and service system. The successful execution of the AKA leads to the establishment of a security system (i.e. a security data set) between the SS and the service system, allowing the provision of a number of security services. In this article, the authors propose the group hierarchical protocol for mutual authentication and key agreement (HGMAKA) for MTC, which will be adapted to both current LTE-A networks and future 5G networks. The main contributions of this document are: (1) Introducing a hierarchical approach as opposed to the first MTCD or existing group leader approach for the implementation of the group AKA between a group of MTCDs and the central network.

(2) Adopt a hierarchical architecture in small cells in accordance with 5G architecture to reduce signal load by authentication compared to macrocellar architecture in existing literature. (3) Introducing route integrity verification for authentication messages to avoid authentication of batch authentication due to errors. (4) Comparison of performances with ten other group diagrams in the literature. For a group size of 100, there is therefore 0.6358 probabilities of need for new group authentication and 0.3642 that new group authentication is not necessary. If the number of groups decreases, resulting in an increase in the number of MTCDs in each group, the likelihood of re-authentication increases (due to an error). Overall, the explanations for the authentication minutes were taken into account. For each metric, a comparison of the different protocols was made taking into account the probabilities shown in Table 3. In addition, MTCDs are generally low-power devices with no possibility of high computation. This requires an authentication protocol with less computational complexity. In addition, an additional problem with cellular TCM is the presence of devices on cellular and interior edges such as underground garages, shopping malls, hospitals, etc., where network connectivity can be poor. Similarly, some devices should not be mobile (for example.

B surveillance camera), while others can be very mobile (for example. B, equipment on trains or buses). Therefore, the authentication procedure must take into account the following factors: (i)Providing massive MTCDs that cause a signal overload (ii) the deployment environment of MTCDs (d. h. Indoor/Outdoor) (iii) MTCD mobility behaviour (i.e. stationary/mobile) (iv) Computational and Storage capabilities of MTCDs The essential advantages of AKA over CAVE-based authentication are: Machine Type Communication (MTC) [8] also known as M2M communication refers to communication between entities without human intervention. This communication mainly involves collecting data by the MTCD and transferring it to an MTC server that processes the data and initiates certain actions. There may also be scenarios in which the MTC server triggers the MTCD to perform an action.