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Compendium Of Canada`s Engagement In International Environmental Agreements

1.24 The department`s performance reports must also strive to be concise and well understood by Canadians. Because they are not intended to be complete or provide comprehensive information on everything a federal department does. Competing priorities often make it more difficult to report on all outstanding programs and initiatives. As a result, there is no indication that responsible departments will use departmental performance reports to report on the results of international environmental agreements. Nevertheless, the Treasury Board of the Secretariat of Canada encourages departments to channel readers to other publications or websites, using their service reports, where they can find more complete performance information. Fourth, the series of technological and organizational regulations for arms control verification has other purposes, such as espionage. Attempts to explain the types of verification required in international agreements must take into account the constraints and opportunities of these overlapping activities, not just the narrower purposes of arms control verification (14, 120, 121). We do not take into account the various agreements on the transport and disposal of hazardous waste, although they are linked to the conservation of natural resources. These include the 1989 Basel Convention on Cross-Border Transfers of Dangerous Waste and Disposal (55) and the 1972 London Convention on Dumping at Sea (56, 57). Although the purpose of CITES is to preserve species, the mechanism is limited to controlling international trade in these species. CITES distinguishes species based on their risk of extinction by listing species in two annexes: the first species at risk of a species for which trade is essentially prohibited; and the second, of threatened species, for which trade is tightly controlled. Since the list decisions are made by the majority of the parties, there is also a third annex in which a country unilaterally places a species in order to inform the international community that the country believes that these species should be subject to international control. The jurisdiction to implement trade restrictions varies considerably from country to country.

The paper addresses these seriatim issues. To illustrate the arguments, we first describe nine international environmental regimes. For everyone, we propose a summary of the problem, a synthesis of the main legal agreements and the approach taken to solve the problem, as well as an assessment (if possible) of compliance with the agreement. Second, we describe the functions and concepts associated with the revision of international environmental agreements. Third, we look at the national experience in respecting and enforcing environmental legislation, particularly in the United States, and we offer some comparisons of this context with the international environment. Fourth, we use several theoretical perspectives to examine the verification models observed in the nine cases and explain the differences between environmental and arms control. In conclusion, we apply some of these findings to forward-looking agreements. For the reader who is not familiar with the gun control literature, a brief critique is included in an appendix.

Third, we must enable interdisciplinary and cross-sector commitments and thus combat pollution through a public health approach. Traditional fields of toxicology, occupational medicine and epidemiology need to be trained, encouraged and supported financially to extend their coalitions to, among others, economists, environmentalists, lawyers, veterinarians and engineers. Transdisciplinary frameworks and logics such as One Health and EcoHealth can be useful here (Aguirre et al.