To explain the idea of the social contract, we analyze contractual approaches in five elements: (1) the role of the social contract (2) the parties (3) Convention (4) the purpose of the agreement (5) what the agreement must show. The weakest interpretation of the contract is that the result of the contract is only an indication of the correct answer to the problem of the law, which, in turn, only suggests that R N a. One could be a “realist” who claims that whether R N has or not, it is a fact that says whether or not the contract apparatus creates R, and that the correct answer to our justification problem (i.e. what we can justify) is that R N a. Here, there is still a logical space for some kind of contract work, but an indicative conclusion of this type of contract would not be a form of “constructivism”. Some have argued, for example, that Scanlon`s theory is in fact based on a kind of natural law theory in which these rights are ahead of the treaty (Mack 2007). Even if this is true, Scanlon can be a kind of social contract theorist. The diversity of possible approaches within the theory of social contract shows the diversity of the different uses to which the theory of the social contract can be applied. Today, it is almost common for contemporary theory of the social contract to be based on hypothetical and non-real convergences. As we have seen, that is certainly the case in a sense. However, in many ways, the “hypothetical/real” gap is artificial: the hypothetical agreement is supposed to model the actual agreement and provide the basis for it. Understanding the contemporary theory of the social contract is the best thing to do, not by insisting on the distinction between real and hypothetical contracts, but by understanding the interaction between the hypothetical and the real.
While the international arena is more suited to the theory of social contract with regard to the question of origin, it poses particular challenges in terms of justice and legitimacy. In particular, the international arena violates the fundamental condition of the theory of social contract, namely that individuals, as Locke put it, were born “promiskuly, who all have the same advantages of nature, and that the use of the same abilities is the same among themselves.”  The arguments of the social contract for justice and legality assume that the contracting parties are relatively equal and symmetrical. It is this restriction that ensures that the material principles that inform the Treaty are reasonable, fair, symmetrical, etc. Similarly, it is this restriction that ensures that any authority empowered by the treaty exercises its authority without any preference or prejudice. For Rawls, as with most contemporary treaty theorists, the goal of an agreement is not, at least directly, the reason for political commitment, but the principles of justice that regulate the fundamental institutions of society. Freeman (2007a: 23), perhaps Rawls` eminent student, focuses on “the social role of norms in public life.” Buchanan is busy justifying the constitutional orders of social and political institutions (2000 ). Gauthier (1986), Scanlon (1998), Darwall (2006), Southwood (2010) and Gaus (2011a) use the contractual apparatus to justify socio-ethical claims. The theories of Roussau`s social contract together form a uniform and coherent vision of our moral and political situation. We naturally have freedom and equality, but our nature has been ruined by our contingent social history.
However, we can overcome this corruption by invoking our free will to reconstitute ourselves politically and on strongly democratic principles, which is a good thing for us, both individually and collectively.